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RECONSIDERING LEGAL REGULATION OF RACE,
SEX, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Ann C. McGinley*
DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN
POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2013) Pp. 216. Hardcover $ 29.95.
JOHN D. SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEW AMERICAN
WORKPLACE (2013). Pp. 416. Hardcover $ 35.00.
SONU BEDI, BEYOND RACE, SEX, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION: LEGAL EQUALITY
WITHOUT IDENTITY (2013). Pp. 289. Hardback $ 99.00.
RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, SEXUALITY, AND
DEMOCRACY FROM OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES (2013). Pp. 266. Paperback $ 32.99.
One of my most enjoyable tasks this summer was to read four books that deal in new
ways with race, class, gender, sexuality, and legal regulation, and to consider if and how
they relate to one another. These books are: 1) Acting White? Rethinking Race in “PostRacial” America by Devon W. Carbado and Mitu Gulati,1 published by Oxford University
Press; 2) After Civil Rights: Racial Realism in the New American Workplace by John D.
Skrentny,2 published by Princeton University Press; 3) Dressing Constitutionally: Hierarchy, Sexuality, and Democracy from Our Hairstyles to Our Shoes by Ruthann Robson,3
published by Cambridge University Press; and 4) Beyond Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation: Legal Equality without Identity by Sonu Bedi,4 published by Cambridge University
Press. Legal scholars who teach in law schools authored Acting White and Dressing Constitutionally, while After Civil Rights and Beyond Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation were
written, respectively, by a scholar in sociology who teaches at a large state university and
a political scientist (and lawyer) who teaches at a private university in the Northeast.
* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas Boyd School of Law, J.D. University
of Pennsylvania, 1982. Thanks to David McClure of the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the Boyd School of Law
and to Linda McClain and Ken Kersch for inviting me to participate in this book review project. Also, thank you
to the editors at the Tulsa Law Review.
1. DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN “POST-RACIAL”
AMERICA (2013).
2. JOHN D. SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEW AMERICAN WORKPLACE
(2013).
3. RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, SEXUALITY, AND DEMOCRACY FROM
OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES (2013).
4. SONU BEDI, BEYOND RACE, SEX, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION: LEGAL EQUALITY WITHOUT IDENTITY
(2013).
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Acting White and After Civil Rights focus on the realities of race in employment
itself and the limits and strictures of employment discrimination law’s prohibition of decision making based on race under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Beyond Race,
Sex, and Sexual Orientation analyzes the problems caused by current judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
with reference to race, sex and sexual orientation. Dressing Constitutionally examines a
broad array of criminal and civil laws in Tudor England and the U.S. as well as the U.S.
Constitution to demonstrate how English and American societies use dress (and undress)
to draw lines based on class and gender.
Read together, these four books tell a fascinating academic tale about the law as
universally and inescapably intertwined with race, sex, sexual orientation, class and other
identities, but simultaneously ineffective in protecting outsiders—those other than white
heterosexual men—from harm. Although the five authors have varying views of whether
the law can accomplish such protection and, if so, how it should do so, they all appear to
share similar perspectives on law, politics, race, gender, and sexuality. Together, they see
the world through progressive eyes, and accept the post-modern notion that identity is
socially constructed. For example, race is not a skin color but much more: it consists of
society’s views of what it means to be black or white, Asian or Latino. Gender, too, is not
biological but rather a series of learned behaviors and appearances that may or may not
indicate that a person is a particular biological sex. Even sexuality, which many argue is
static and immutable, is variable and changeable. 5 In essence, all of these authors would
likely agree that race, gender, and sexuality are in large part a performance rather than a
status. It is important to understand this positioning in order fully to comprehend the arguments the authors make.
I. DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULALTI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN
“POST-RACIAL” AMERICA
In Acting White, Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati,6 law professors at UCLA and
Duke Law Schools, respectively, posit their theory of “Working Identity,” which explains
the extra burdens employees of color bear in workplaces staffed predominantly by white
men and women.7 Although all workers—both Insiders and Outsiders8—perform their
identities to make themselves more palatable9 at work, workers of color must engage in

5. Id. at 239-41. Sonu Bedi argues that the same-sex marriage movement has an interest in demonstrating
that sexuality is immutable in order to convince courts to apply strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause to sexuality, but he notes that this understanding privileges some types of gay lives over
others. Id. at 241. “Rendering marriage constitutive of gay identity essentializes it, stigmatizing . . . non-heteronormative desires and behaviors.” Id.
6. In the interest of full disclosure, I have co-authored an article with Mitu Gulati and we taught a winter
session course at UNLV together. See Tracey George et. al, The New Old Legal Realism, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
689 (2011).
7. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 1, at 1.
8. The authors use the term “Outsiders” to refer to persons other than white heterosexual men, who are in
the minority as a result of their race, ethnicity, sex, gender, or sexual orientation. Id. at 27. They use the term
“Insiders” to refer to the “norm”: white men in the workplace. Id. Because the authors capitalize these terms as
well as “Working Identity,” I will follow suit throughout this review.
9. “Palatable” is a term of art used by the authors to connote that the person is more acceptable to Insiders.
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significantly more performances to counter negative stereotypes and fit in at work.10 In
fact, Working Identity is much more complicated than merely attempting to counter negative stereotypes. Workers of color use various methods to negotiate their identities at
work, including racial comforting, strategic passing, exploiting stereotypes, providing discomfort, selling out, and buying back.11
Racial comforting consists of behaviors by Outsiders designed to put Insiders at ease
with the Outsiders’ status.12 For example, a Muslim may emphasize that he attended an
American college, was a member of a fraternity, and played American team sports. He
may also avoid associations with other Muslims, display the American flag prominently,
and laugh at jokes about Muslim terrorists. 13
Strategic passing occurs when an Outsider fools Insiders into believing that he is one
of them “by affirmatively identifying or associating with institutions, cultural practices,
and social activities that are stereotypically perceived to be white.” 14 One example of strategic passing is the black person who “express[es] an affinity for ‘stuff white people like,’”
including: public radio, indie music, and Whole Foods Markets.15 The problem with strategic passing is that Insiders tend to see the Outsider who strategically passes as an exception, and, therefore, the Outsider reinforces, rather than destroys, the stereotype.16 This
reaction is termed “racial exceptionalism.” 17
Outsiders also exploit stereotypes by using them to their advantage. 18 For example,
a Korean American worker may exploit the stereotype of the technically savvy and hard
working Asian by working harder in order to gain a promotion. 19 One problem with exploiting stereotypes is that it may help the individual but harm other Korean Americans by
reinforcing stereotypes in the workplace. 20
Providing discomfort refers to an Outsider’s consistently pointing out unfairness in
the workplace.21 While this behavior may be authentic, it may also be a performance designed to provide legitimacy to the organization by demonstrating how democratic it is. 22
Outsiders may also “sell out” and “buy back.”23 Selling out consists of affirming the
view that Insiders prefer.24 An example would be an Outsider who takes the position that
a particular situation did not occur because of race. 25 Buying back is a strategy used by
Outsiders who recognize that they have harmed their (Outsider) communities by using
10. Id. at 35.
11. Id. at 27-35.
12. Id. at 27.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 29.
15. Id. at 29-31 (quoting Christian Lander, Full List of Stuff White People Like, STUFF WHITE PEOPLE LIKE,
http://stuffwhitepeoplelike.com/full-list-of-stuff-white-people-like/). This list of things white people like is
tongue-in-cheek, but the authors note that there are stereotypes about what whites and blacks like.
16. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 1, at 31.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 33.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 33-34.
23. Id. at 34.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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racial comforting and other strategies at work. Outsiders, then, may attempt to make
amends by buying back, for example, by siding with Outsider interests in a dispute between Outsiders and Insiders. 26 One reason Outsiders may engage in buying back is “to
retain status in the Outsider community, while simultaneously maintaining a certain
amount of legitimacy within the Insider institution.” 27
These identity performances pose significant burdens on employees of color.
“Working Identity [i]s [w]ork,” after all.28
As Carbado and Gulati explain, the pervasive view in our society that our workplaces
and social climates should be colorblind exacts a larger toll on persons of color than on
white individuals at work.29 For example, a group of white employees can go out to lunch
every day without anyone’s noticing, but if Latino employees go out to lunch together
once a week, others will assume that they are “cliquish,” or like to stay with their own
kind.30 The authors note that the colorblind norm does not require whites to avoid other
whites, but it does require persons of color to avoid other minorities and to spend time
with whites.31 In this way, ironically, it operates as a “color conscious burden.” 32 In institutions, then, persons of color must be more careful about their racial affiliations than white
people.33
Carbado and Gulati explain the implications of their theory: 1) people who work
their identities are performing extra work; 2) it is not necessary for employees to believe
that their employers are consciously racist for them to perform identities because research
shows the prevalence of implicit bias as a source of discrimination and prejudice; 3) phenotype is not the only basis upon which people make racial judgments; 4) most workplaces
are structured around the notion of colorblindness, and to the extent that “racial salience”
threatens the colorblind norm, Outsiders have an interest in working their identities; 5)
there is no claim that there is a particular way to act “white,” but there are stereotypes of
what whiteness is; and 6) the model of working identity challenges the traditional concept
of employment discrimination law that views discrimination as resulting from a racist employer.34
Working Identity is not limited to racial identity. In chapters three and four, Carbado
and Gulati discuss performance at the intersection of race and gender. Working Identity
theory derives from intersectionality theory, which recognizes that particular aspects of a
person’s identity cannot be disaggregated. 35 In other words, black women will suffer a
particular discrimination based on their being black women, not separate race and/or gender discrimination. Working Identity takes intersectionality theory one step further in that

26. Id.
27. Id. The authors identify this motive as a cynical view of the reasons for the Outsider’s behavior. Id.
28. Id. at 35.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 38-39.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 39.
33. Id. The authors identify other costs involved with working identity: compromising one’s identity, the
costs of poor performances, and backfire costs. Id. at 40-41.
34. Id. at 42-43.
35. Id. at 69-70.
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it focuses on intra-racial and gender discrimination.36 Not only are black women potentially discriminated against because of their inseparable race and gender identities, but also
there is discrimination against some black women and not others because of their Working
Identities.37 For example, if four black women are hired in a particular year as associates
in a law firm, it will be nearly impossible for a fifth black female applicant, who is not
hired, to prove race and gender discrimination. 38 The authors posit, however, that while
the first four black women likely worked their identities to conform with white norms and
tastes, the fifth black woman may have suffered discrimination because she worked her
identity in a different way, or because she failed to work her identity to make herself more
appealing to whites.39 Unlike the other black female applicants, she may have an Africansounding name like Tyisha, not straighten her hair, live in a predominantly black neighborhood, and be a single mother. Carbado and Gulati conclude that refusing to hire her
because of her Working Identity may still be racial discrimination.40 Even if one disagrees
that race is a social construction and the Working Identity of the applicant in this case is
“not race per se, it remains plausible that an employer could draw upon any one of those
Working Identity factors, and certainly all of them together, to conclude that Tyisha is
‘more black’ or ‘too black’ as compared to the other black women.” 41 Thus, Working
Identity theory includes intra-race discrimination and explains why differential treatment
of individuals because of their failure to work their identities in ways that are pleasing to
those in power may constitute discrimination based on race.
In chapter four, Carbado and Gulati address gender performances of white women.
Originally, they note, the courts did not see gender performance as relevant to discrimination based on sex, but things changed in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.42 Ann Hopkins
sued Price Waterhouse for refusing to make her a partner because her dress and behavior
were, in the partners’ eyes, unduly masculine. 43 The Supreme Court recognized that failing
to promote a woman to partner because she is inappropriately masculine is discrimination
because of sex.44 Following Price Waterhouse, however, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,
decided Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.45 Darlene Jespersen, a twenty-year veteran
bartender, sued Harrah’s for sex discrimination when the employer fired her for refusing
to wear makeup.46 She alleged that the dress code, which required women, but not men, to
wear makeup was facially discriminatory. 47 The Ninth Circuit, however, held that the Harrah’s appearance code did not violate Title VII because it did not impose an unequal burden on men and women; the court distinguished Price Waterhouse because in that case

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 70.
Id. at 75-76.
See id. at 74-77.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 76-77.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 84; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 1, at 84.
Id.
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
Id. at 1108.
Id.
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there was no dress code.48 In Jespersen the court stated that an appearance code that unreasonably stereotypes women would violate Title VII, but it concluded that requiring
makeup does not unreasonably stereotype women.49 Carbado and Gulati criticize this holding as unduly limiting the concept of sex stereotyping, and ignoring the history of women
and makeup, which became much more prevalent as women entered the workplace, in
essence, to reify gender differences. 50
At first blush, a reader might wonder why this discussion appears in a book about
“acting white,” but chapter four demonstrates well how gender, race, and sexuality intersect. Darlene Jespersen is a white woman who is expected to perform her gender, race, and
sexuality in a particular way. Moreover, an important question raised by Carbado and Gulati’s analysis is whether Price Waterhouse can be used in future race discrimination cases
to argue that it is illegal discrimination to require a black employee to work her identity in
accordance with “white” dress, grooming, and behavior norms. In the appearance code
cases, the courts seem to recognize that we all have to work our identities (although the
courts would not use this term), but apparently do not understand the disparate burden that
Working Identity may impose on Outsiders. In Jespersen, the court justified the result
because the appearance code was reasonable and not more burdensome on women than on
men.51 But who decides what is reasonable? What is the norm? Will courts permit different
appearance codes for persons of different races, national origins, and religions so long as
the code does not impose an unequal burden on different groups (as courts do in gender
cases)? All of these questions demonstrate the complexity of the regulation of what some
courts see as minimally important appearance codes and the difficulty in distinguishing
Price Waterhouse from the appearance code cases.
Legal Implications
As the authors point out, Title VII ordinarily does not prohibit performances described as “Working Identity,” nor does it prohibit employers from discriminating against
employees of color because of their failure to work their identities in a way that is palatable
to white employers and their customers or clients.52 One problem is that although the appearance codes differ from much Working Identity in that they comprise regulation imposed by the employer, much of the behavior racial minorities engage in to work their
identities is not imposed by the employer.53 Employees of color often “voluntarily” engage
in these Working Identities as a preventive measure to assure they will be competitive in
the job.54 This does not mean, however, that the performance is optional or even conscious.55 In fact, while many of the stereotypes that encourage these performances are conscious, others exist in the unconscious of the employer and co-workers.56 And, even though

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 1, at 86.
Id. at 86-87.
Id.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 42-44.
Id.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 42.
Id.
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many workers of color engage in these performances consciously, others do so unconsciously.57 Moreover, as the authors demonstrate, it is very risky for employees to neglect
these performances.58 Even if the law prohibited an employer’s action because of the employee’s failure to work his or her identity, the authors assert that it would be very difficult
to prove that an employee has engaged in identity performances. 59
Acting White demonstrates the weakness of anti-discrimination law’s model that focuses on the racist employer who engages in discrimination against an individual because
of his or her race.60 The authors explain that overtly racist behavior in workplaces is not
the reality anymore.61 Instead, Outsiders are forced to engage in much more work than
their Insider counterparts to negotiate their identities at work, but the law does not recognize this additional work at all.62 The scenario gets more complicated, the authors note,
when we recognize the agency of the minority worker. 63 And, they admit, it is unclear
what the law could do to remedy the issue.
Carbado and Gulati hope to begin a dialogue, and, at the very least, inform Insiders
of the extra work that Outsiders need to perform. But it seems that they may be giving up
too soon. Although not all Working Identity can be compensated, there are some opportunities where compensation may be had. While it is true that it would be difficult for Outsider employees to recover for engaging in additional work on their identities under Title
VII, to the extent an employer refuses to hire an applicant or to promote an employee or
fires an employee for failure to live up to Insider standards, Title VII may provide a remedy. Moreover, to the extent that the employer permits harassment of an employee for
failing to adhere to Insider standards, Title VII may provide a remedy. Furthermore, “neutral” dress and appearance codes that have a disparate impact on employees or applicants
of color may also create a cause of action for Outsiders. A good example is the proposed
set of Army regulations that were to go into effect at the end of March, 2014. Known as
AR 670-1, the proposed rules were suspended pending a study by Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel because of the protest of black women. 64 The proposed rules prohibited
twists, braids, cornrows, and dreadlocks. Black women argued that black hair differs from
white hair and the proposed standard did not take into account how black hair grows; as a
result, it creates a standard for all women based on the texture of white women’s hair. 65
They further argued that the new proposed regulations intentionally targeted black
women’s hair, and used derogatory terms such as “unkempt” and “matted” to describe

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 42-44.
62. Id. at 42.
63. Id. at 43-44.
64. Ayana Byrd & Lori L. Tharps, When Black Hair Is Against the Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/01/opinion/when-black-hair-is-against-the-rules.html?_r=0; Helene Cooper,
Hagel Seeks Review of Military Policies on Hairstyles, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/us/hagel-seeks-review-of-military-policies-on-hairstyles.html.
65. Id.
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black women’s hair.66 Assuming the applicability of Title VII to the Army’s dress regulations, if a lawsuit were brought challenging the new proposed regulations, the plaintiffs
would likely have a valid disparate impact cause of action because the policy, though facially neutral, would have had a disparate effect on black women and would not survive
legal scrutiny if the Army could not prove a defense.67 The plaintiffs also may have had a
valid disparate treatment cause of action if they could prove that the Army intentionally
targeted black women’s hair when they wrote the standards. Fortunately, the Army revised
the proposed rules to eliminate reference to “matted” and “unkempt” hair and permitted
braids and twists that are uniformly kept.68
“Working identity” is not limited to workplaces. We find racial minorities working
their identities in politics, and in the town square. The Prologue includes a description of
Barack Obama’s need to walk the fine line between not being too black (for the white
voters) and not being too white (for the black voters). 69 This task constantly requires a
negotiation of Obama’s identity as a bi-racial candidate and President.70 Chapter two highlights the comment Senate Leader Harry Reid made about Obama when he was first running for President: that he had a good chance of winning because of his “light skin” and
because he spoke “with no Negro dialect unless he wanted to have one.”71 These comments
demonstrate that one must “talk white” in order to be considered a contender for national
political office.
Chapter five explains that African American men must work their identities to avoid
the broad assumption that they are criminals. 72 The authors explain that black parents instruct their sons from early childhood to work their identities in a way that is not threatening to the police and that demonstrates that they are “good blacks.” 73 This additional work
is necessary because of the assumption that most black men are bad.74 The “good blacks”
are the exception. This issue was particularly highlighted by the death of Michael Brown
in Ferguson, Missouri during the summer of 2014 at the hand of a white police officer.
Black parents spoke to the press about the difficult conversations they engage in with their
sons to protect them from Insiders who assume they are dangerous. 75
Carbado and Gulati deliver a very thought-provoking book, the strength of which

66. Id.
67. Under Title VII law, a plaintiff proves a disparate impact cause of action by demonstrating that a particular neutral employment practice creates a disparate impact upon a protected group. Once this proof is made,
the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to prove that the neutral employment practice is a business
necessity. If the defendant proves business necessity, the burden of persuasion shifts back to the plaintiff to
prove that a less discriminatory alternative exists. If the defendant fails to prove business necessity or the plaintiff
successfully proves a less discriminatory alternative, the plaintiff prevails. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
68. Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia, ARMY PUBLISHING DIRECTORATE,
http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r670_1.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
69. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 1, at 10.
70. Id. at 10-11.
71. Id. at 46 (quoting Chris Cilllizza, Harry Reid Apologizes for “Light Skinned” Remark About Obama,
WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/thefix/senate/harry-reid-apologizes-forligh.html).
72. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 1, at 96-97.
73. Id. at 103.
74. See id. at 96-97.
75. Michael Martinez, Stephanie Elam & Erica Henry, Within Black Families, Hard Truths Told to Sons
Amid Ferguson Unrest, CNN (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/15/living/parenting-black-sons-ferguson-missouri/.
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lies in its theory, readability, and the excellent examples taken from pop culture and used
to explain their theory of Working Identity. Throughout, they refer to Obama, Trayvon
Martin, and Dave Chapelle, among others. They make good use of hypotheticals to explain
their theory, and make a compelling case that Working Identity is a topic that Insiders need
to understand and one that we need to figure out how to remedy. Unfortunately, the book’s
examples are limited to jobs of upper middle class workers and professionals. The book
would have benefitted from discussion of workplaces that employ lower middle and working class individuals. I suspect there may be rich material in those sectors for the next
Carbado and Gulati book. John Skrentny’s book, After Civil Rights, which I review next,
includes a valuable chapter on lower middle and working class workers.
II. JOHN D. SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEW AMERICAN
WORKPLACE
John Skrentny is a professor of sociology and the director of the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of California, San Diego. He understands Title
VII law very well, but has a slightly different take on the law than most law professors do.
This is a good thing. Throughout his book, Skrentny references the work of scholars of
law, management, sociology, anthropology, and other social sciences. The empirical, anecdotal, and theoretical research from all of these disciplines adds significant depth and
richness to the book.
Skrentny’s thesis is that there is a disconnect between modern employment practices
that take race into account in determining qualifications for certain jobs and the law of
Title VII, which forbids the use of race to make hiring and promotional decisions. 76 He
argues that there is substantial bi-partisan support for the practice of considering race in
hiring.77 High-level politicians, for example, openly consult race when they appoint individuals to serve on their staffs, in the Presidential Cabinet, and even on the Supreme
Court.78 Media, journalism, entertainment, advertising, marketing, education, medicine,
law enforcement, and other industries take race into account in hiring even though doing
so violates Title VII.79
Skrentny calls race-based decision-making in employment “racial realism.”80 Unlike
legal affirmative action under Title VII, which permits employers to make race-based employment decisions to remedy past discrimination, racial realism is forward-looking, and
justifies the use of race for a number of reasons. 81 Most particularly, organizations view
race as a qualification for certain positions. 82 Race, in their view, makes the individual
better able to perform the requirements of the job.83 Others use race to signal to racial

76. SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 18-19.
77. See id. at 92.
78. Id. at 93.
79. Id. at 11.
80. Id. at 10-11. This description is similar to the “new old legal realism” that Tracey George, Mitu Gulati,
and I found when we did an empirical study of the Las Vegas casinos’ reaction to the case of Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co. See George et. al., supra note 6.
81. SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 10.
82. See id. at 11.
83. Id.
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minorities that the organization respects their views or wishes their business. 84 Still others
may use race in hiring to satisfy both goals: hiring more qualified individuals and signaling. Skrentny defines racial realism as “refer[ring] to employer perceptions that workers
vary by race in their ability to do certain jobs and contribute to organizational effectiveness, and/or in the kinds of signals their racial backgrounds send to customers and citizens.”85 When Skrentny speaks of using racial realism, he is not referring to employers
who hire whites because they believe that being white is a qualification for the job or
because they are trying to signal to white customers. Rather, his discussion is limited to
hiring persons of color into particular jobs.
Skrentny supports his factual assertion with empirical, anecdotal, and historical evidence that a wide variety of employers take race into account in determining whom to
hire and/or promote. He has separate chapters demonstrating that racial realism exists in
the professions and business,86 in politics and government (including education and policing),87 in media and entertainment,88 and finally, in what he calls the “low-skilled sector.”89
He demonstrates that in each of these sectors employers use race as a qualifier and/or
signal for hiring, promotion, and placement into jobs. Noting that there is no Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification (“BFOQ”) defense under Title VII for racial preferences, 90 and
that the only legitimate use of race under Title VII is a circumscribed affirmative action
policy that is remedial in nature, temporary, and does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of whites, he makes clear that most employers’ racial realist decision making is illegal
under Title VII.91 The only area where the judiciary has interpreted Title VII (and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) to permit racial decision-making in employment, he explains, is in policing.92 This, however, is a very limited exception—a type
of judicially created BFOQ for race.
Skrentny also examines the empirical support for employers’ beliefs that persons of
color may be more qualified for certain jobs. While it is clear that the employers who
engage in racial realism in employment decision-making believe that race is an important
qualifier for certain jobs, Skrentny explains that the empirical support for these beliefs is
mixed. He faithfully describes the studies pointing in different directions and ultimately
concludes that, in most areas, there is some slight support for the employers’ beliefs. 93 But,
clearly, the support is not as strong as employers assert. Moreover, it seems that many of
these industries and jobs fall into different categories that are diversely affected by the
history of slavery and racism in the U.S. For example, in education and medicine, there is
support for the belief that black teachers are better for black children and that black doctors

84. Id. at 13-14.
85. Id. at xi.
86. Id. at 38.
87. Id. at 89.
88. Id. at 153.
89. Id. at 216.
90. Id. at 15-16.
91. Id. at 81-82.
92. Id. at 135-42.
93. Id. at 46-50 (medicine); 54-56 (journalism); 70-71 (marketing); 110-12 (judging); 119–20 (policing);
130-33 (teaching).
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order better treatment for black patients. 94 Of course, it is difficult to separate the effects
of racism on these results from the lack of training of white teachers and white doctors,
but there is no doubt that an implicit bias exists, and it is not surprising that black children
and patients may do better with black professionals.
In analyzing the empirical research, Skrentny gives interesting historical background. For example, he reports on the history of integrated schools in the northern part
of the U.S. in the early twentieth century.95 This is a fascinating, little-told account. In the
early twentieth century, schools in the North were integrated; black children and white
children regularly attended school together and were taught by white teachers. 96 Because
white teachers and students often mistreated black children, black leaders such as W.E.B.
DuBois aligned with black parents and argued for segregated schools for black children
with black teachers.97 Despite this history in the North, by the middle of the twentieth
century, the black community shifted positions and began to argue for racial integration in
the South in order to improve the condition of blacks, including black children in the
schools.98
In the marketing sector, Skrentny explains how early in the twentieth century a number of companies used black sales professionals to sell products to the black consumer
market.99 Notably, Pepsi-Cola attempted to appeal to black customers by using black salesmen exclusively to sell to blacks and by using blacks in advertisements. 100
Considering Skrentny and Carbado & Gulati Together
Skrentny’s argument regarding the prevalence of racial realism appears to contradict
the assertion Carbado and Gulati make in Acting White that colorblindness is a broad notion that governs in contemporary organizations. If colorblindness does exist as an operating principle in most organizations, how can these same organizations practice racial realism? At first blush, it seems that there is a conflict between Carbado and Gulati’s
underlying premises and those of Skrentny. But the books actually present similar views.
Where Carbado and Gulati see “colorblindness” as a goal based on the false premise that
America is post-racial, and that colorblindness is actually possible and beneficial to all,
Skrentny indicts Title VII for turning its back on the reality that employers consult race on
a daily basis to make employment decisions. Carbado and Gulati demonstrate how colorblindness may have the opposite effect of its purported goal: it can create “color conscious”
behavior when applied to racial minorities in workplaces whose employees are predominantly white, while fooling white employees into believing that the workplace is raceneutral.101
Carbado and Gulati speak of the underlying and invisible burdens and pressures that

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 47, 130-33.
Id. at 121-29.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 122-23.
Id. at 121-24.
Id. at 70-71.
Id. at 62.
See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 1, at 58-62.
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Outsiders bear in workplaces, while white employers and employees simultaneously congratulate themselves on reaching a colorblind workplace. 102 In essence, Carbado and Gulati, while falling short of making a proposal for legal reform, argue that race does matter
in workplaces as they currently operate, even though many of us do not realize it. They
speak of the invisible burden of race and Outsider status in organizations, while Skrentny
highlights the employers’ views about the importance of race to their organizations.
These approaches may represent the opposite sides of the same coin. Skrentny presents significant empirical evidence demonstrating that there is a serious question as to
whether race-based qualifications really make a difference. In other words, does a black
schoolteacher understand black children and teach them better than a white teacher? Do
black medical doctors do a better job referring black patients to specialists and getting
treatment for their patients? Do black police officers do a better job than their white counterparts in law enforcement in black neighborhoods? Skrentny suggests that the empirical
research is mixed on all of these questions. There is likely some support for the conclusion
that race may be a qualifier in these positions, but it is not as strong as employers seem to
believe it is.
Moreover, Skrentny recognizes that using race as a qualification has two side effects
on persons of color. First, this practice actually increases the number of racial minorities
hired into organizations, certainly a good thing.103 By the same token, those hired are often
pigeonholed in “minority-only” positions and have difficulty rising in the ranks of the organization.104 This fact suggests a connection with Carbado and Gulati’s performance theory. It may be that Outsiders who are hired because their employers see race as a qualification for the job will have to work their identities in ways that make them palatable as
representatives of the minority communities. So, in addition to the burden of being forced
to remain in an Outsider-oriented job, these minority employees may also bear the burden
of performing their race in ways that are not natural to them.
Furthermore, Carbado and Gulati’s examples pertain mostly to upper-middle class
workplaces that are predominantly white. Skrentny, on the other hand, includes a chapter
on the low-skills sector. This is perhaps his best chapter. It demonstrates that while racial
realism may have some benefits in other sectors, use of racial realism in the low-paid market is troubling. In this market, employers prefer Latinos and Asians (and particularly immigrants) to native African American workers. 105 The empirical evidence he presents
demonstrates that this preference is nationwide.106 Skrentny gives examples of workplaces
in which employers have intentionally encouraged black employees to leave by putting
more pressure on them and speeding up production. 107 In these workplaces, the employers
replace the blacks with Latinos or Asians. In jobs where Latinos predominate, employers
permit the employees to speak Spanish, thus creating a wedge between Spanish-speaking
and black employees. The black employees are often overwhelmed and uncomfortable

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. Carbado and Gulati are not judgmental—this is my language.
SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 270.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 219, 222-37.
Id.
Id. at 231.
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because they do not speak the language. 108
Skrentny documents that employers see Latinos and Asians as particularly hardworking and prefer these groups because they work hard without complaining. 109 Employers perceive that the problem with blacks is that they know their labor rights and insist
upon them. Asians and Latinos, on the other hand, are often undocumented or afraid of
losing their jobs. Consequently, they can be exploited. In essence, then, employers prefer
them because their condition is one that makes them exploitable. This behavior, Skrentny
notes, “is often supported by local governments in rural southern areas of the country that
give manufacturers major tax incentives to relocate their plants from the Midwest to their
towns.”110 Employers’ preference for Asians and Latinos, combined with tax incentives to
relocate, create an interest in hiring illegal, undocumented workers and exploiting them.
Ironically, Skrentny’s account demonstrates that Title VII has failed to recognize the
“brown-collarization” of American industry as a violation of the statute.111 Brown-collarization refers to the movement of certain plants, particularly in the meatpacking industry,
from highly paid, unionized jobs occupied by whites to low-paid, dangerous, non-unionized jobs occupied by immigrants, particularly Latinos. 112 Skrentny discusses how the
Midwestern meatpacking industry went from unionized, predominantly white employees
to non-unionized, predominantly Latino employees.113 As these jobs were de-unionized
and taken up by Latinos, wages dipped drastically and jobs became significantly more
dangerous. The law has been ineffective in protecting both the white unionized workers
and the salary scales and working conditions of the vulnerable Latino replacement workers.114
Moreover, Skrentny explains that there are whole pockets of industries, occupied
almost exclusively by Asians, whose owners ordinarily use word-of-mouth hiring to employ.115 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has brought claims
arguing that using word-of-mouth hiring has a disparate impact on black employees, but
the courts have held that there was no cause of action because word-of-mouth hiring constitutes passive behavior for which the employer is not liable. 116 In E.E.O.C. v. Consolidated Service Systems, for example, Judge Richard Posner, writing for a majority of a
panel in the Seventh Circuit, held that a Korean immigrant employer who hired a vast
majority of Koreans in his workforce did not discriminate against applicants of other races
even though the employer’s expert testified that it was “natural” for a recent immigrant
from Korea to hire other Koreans. 117 While the EEOC argued that this testimony was an
admission that the employer took race into account in hiring his Korean employees, Judge

108. Id. at 245.
109. Id. at 222-27.
110. Id.
111. See Leticia Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making of the Brown
Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L. J. 961 (2006).
112. See generally id. (discussing issues and theories associated with the “brown-collarization” of the workforce).
113. SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 232-37.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 252.
116. E.E.O.C. v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 305 (7th Cir. 1991).
117. E.E.O.C. v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 237 (7th Cir. 1993).
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Posner disagreed.118 Most of these workplaces avoid hiring black employees. So, the law
has also failed in preventing discrimination against black job applicants.
Unlike Carbado and Gulati, Skrentny offers a number of reform proposals. Given
the state of Congress and the more conservative Supreme Court, some of these proposals
are more practical than others. Skrentny’s reforms are so plentiful that it is not possible to
recount all of them here, but his book is full of interesting ideas. The legal reforms he calls
for are less practical and realistic than his other ideas For example, he argues that Title VII
should be amended to permit the use of race to go beyond affirmative action. 119 However,
there is a serious question, at least in the public sector, as to whether this amendment would
be constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. His most interesting ideas are to use
public relations campaigns to demonstrate that employers who relocate are harming employees.
He encourages the country to debate racial realism and consider the following reform principles: 1) to keep jobs open to all even though there is some racial realism in
hiring–to not exclude anyone because of race; 2) in the high skilled sector, to permit racial
realism as well as affirmative action, but to go beyond remedying past discrimination; and
3) to reform Title VII explicitly to allow voluntary racial realism as an update to voluntary
affirmative action rules in existence.120 Skrentny argues that the law should explicitly give
employers more freedom to use race in hiring. There are serious questions as to whether
such a law would be constitutional, but Skrentny argues that conservative judges would
approve of this proposal because it would give employers more freedom to run their businesses as they see fit.121
Reading Acting White and After Civil Rights together raises some interesting questions. Skrentny seeks to expose the fallacy of the colorblind approach in U.S. workplaces
and would permit employers to consider race in certain jobs as qualifications and/or as
signaling. Carbado and Gulati would likely agree that colorblindness as a goal is not a
good idea because, even if employers are unaware of color conscious behavior, employees
of color must be color conscious in order to appear colorblind. Skrentny’s solution, however, might actually exacerbate the problems raised by Carbado and Gulati. It may be that
if employers are given leeway to consider race of minority candidates when determining
whether a person is qualified for a job or an important symbol to potential consumers, they
may engage in exactly the type of discrimination Carbado and Gulati discuss. Employers
may decide to hire only those employees of color who are willing to perform their racial
identities in a manner consistent with the employer’s perceived goals. Thus, it may be that
Skrentny’s approach would encourage the type of intra-racial discrimination that Carbado
and Gulati identify. On the other hand, an open debate in society that leads to legal reform
giving employers the option to choose employees of color over white employees may open
up employment to persons who perform their racial identities in more authentic fashions.
Given the rapid shift in society concerning the rights of gays and transgender individuals
and their acceptance by younger people, perhaps an open dialogue would reveal to employers that young people may be much more open to a variety of racial, gender, and sexual

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
SKRENTNY, supra note 2, at 33.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 83.
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identities at work.
Skrentny has authored a fascinating book that is filled with law, information about
how employers operate notwithstanding the law, and empirical evidence that supports and,
at times, contradicts some employers’ beliefs about the usefulness of employing race as a
qualifier for jobs. This empirical research should be useful to lawyers who litigate these
cases using Title VII. And Skrentny comes up with a cross-disciplinary approach to solving problems. Not all of his solutions are politically or constitutionally possible, but the
legislative solutions he suggests are interesting and innovative, and, perhaps in the future,
may be effective.
III. SONU BEDI, BEYOND RACE, SEX, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION: LEGAL EQUALITY
WITHOUT IDENTITY
Unlike the previous two books, which focused almost entirely on Title VII, Professor
Bedi, a political theorist at Dartmouth College, suggests a new interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Bedi argues that
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, which relies on three tiers of scrutiny, is not only ineffective in protecting racial and sexual minorities, but is also harmful. While the current
approach to the Equal Protection Clause concludes that states may not discriminate on
account of certain protected characteristics such as race, national origin or sex, unless there
is a compelling governmental interest, Bedi’s approach argues that the Equal Protection
Clause limits the states’ power to act for certain reasons. 122 He argues “that if a law is
based on animus or a certain conception of the good life, the state exceeds its power in
enacting it.”123
Bedi proposes looking at the motive behind the challenged legislation to determine
whether it should withstand constitutional scrutiny. 124 Thus, he would jettison the threetiered approach and apply the same analysis to all classifications. Under the “powers review” that he suggests, the law will violate the Equal Protection Clause if it is based on
animus, hostility,125 or a conception of the good life.126 This proposal—to consider the
legitimacy of the purpose behind the law—Bedi argues, would be beneficial because a
“powers review” does not require the identification of suspect classes. 127 Consequently,
“it avoids placing the Court in a position of determining which groups are constitutionally
‘in’ and which are ‘out.’”128 In fact, it does not matter which group is affected by the law;
if the law is passed for illegitimate reasons, it goes beyond the power of the State to enact
it.129 When using the current tiered approach, the Court, he argues, is perceived as political, and the current test has little substance to help judges make decisions. By removing
the Court from this position, the “powers review” increases the legitimacy of the Court

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

BEDI, supra note 4, at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and moves away from charges of judicial activism. 130
Second, Bedi argues that a “powers review” is preferable because it “mitigate[s] the
sting of the counter-majoritarian difficulty because the Court [does] not invalidat[e] [a]
law on behalf of a particular identity group,” but does so on behalf of the public itself. 131
Third, he argues that if the Court focuses on invalidating laws because of their hostile
purpose, strict scrutiny is not necessary. 132 Bedi claims that a focus on the motive or purpose behind the legislation will make obvious the distinction between benign legislation
such as affirmative action and legislation animated by hostility such as Jim Crow laws. 133
The courts, he believes, will have little trouble seeing the difference if they focus on the
purpose or intent behind the bill.134 Fourth, Bedi argues that the “powers review” resists
the subjective nature of the “compelling purpose” and “narrowly tailored” tests currently
in use.135 These tests, he claims, invite judges to make decisions based on their own ideology.136
It is important to understand that Bedi’s approach is not to return to the original
intent of the legislature when passing the law. Instead, he considers the motive that led to
the passage of the Act to see if it is unacceptable. In doing so, one does not ordinarily look
at what the legislators said as they passed the law, but at the law itself. If the statute demonstrates animus or hostility toward a particular group or embodies a moral or religious conception of the “good life,” the state, he argues, has no power to enact it, and it must be
struck down.137
Bedi notes that the current tiered approach requires particular identity groups to
prove that they are a “discrete and insular minority” with little political power, which requires the group to appeal to the Court to act as the group’s protector.138 This sets up a
response from majority groups claiming that they are the victims of court actions that are
meant to protect minority groups.139 This “special rights” argument by the majority creates
a counter-majoritarian difficulty, making the Court appear an anti-democratic institution
that selects among groups’ rights. 140 It is preferable, he argues, to conceive of the Equal
Protection Clause as a limit on state power to enact any legislation that violates the State’s
purpose for law.141
Bedi does not create his argument out of whole cloth. He carefully looks at the history of the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to demonstrate that under a number of circumstances, the Court has engaged in the analysis that Bedi prefers. In essence,
his “powers review” forecloses any use for an identity analysis. For example, he discusses
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recent cases such as Romer v. Evans142 and Lawrence v. Texas143 to prove his point. In
both of these cases, the individuals challenging the law were gay men who are not yet
considered members of a suspect class by the Court. Nonetheless, the Court struck down
legislation that arbitrarily limited their freedom without analyzing whether homosexuals
should be a protected class. In Romer, the Court struck down an amendment to the Colorado State Constitution that forbade localities from passing legislation that made discrimination against homosexuals illegal.144 The Court did not declare homosexuals to be members of a protected class that deserves strict scrutiny. 145 Instead, it concluded that the only
reason for such legislation is animosity toward gays and lesbians, and that a “bare . . .
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government[]
interest.”146 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court struck down a state law criminalizing gay
sex and invoked the individuals’ right to privacy. 147 As Bedi points out, however, the Court
noted that moral reasons alone are constitutionally insufficient to support lawmaking under
a rational review standard.148 Moreover, the Court stated that the mere fact that a majority
in a state has traditionally viewed particular behavior immoral is not sufficient to uphold
a law.149
Bedi analogizes this reasoning to the interpretation of the Establishment Clause,
which prohibits government from favoring a certain religion or from favoring a religious
life over a non-religious one.150 Bedi also explains that the Court’s analysis in Romer is
similar to that in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,151 which was decided by the Court in 1886. In Yick
Wo, the Court concluded that San Francisco violated the Equal Protection clause when it
granted licenses to run laundries to white-owned businesses but not to those owned by
Chinese immigrants.152 The Court did not use a strict scrutiny or racial classification analysis. Rather, as Bedi points out, the Court considered the purpose behind the regulation,
which could be nothing other than hostility, and struck it down.153 Thus, Bedi demonstrates
that there is a line of cases going back more than a century that uses the analysis he proposes.
Bedi also emphasizes that the State cannot justify its legislation by presenting a false
purpose or motive in bad faith. 154 He states that a “powers review” requires the Court to
analyze the law’s actual purpose.155 As Bedi puts it, “a conceivable purpose is constitutionally inadmissible.”156 Thus, a “plausible” purpose would not support the legislation. 157
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This appears to be one weakness of Bedi’s approach, but perhaps it can be resolved through
judicial factfinding at the district court level. It seems that in order to find out what a particular piece of legislation’s actual purpose is (rather than that it is supported by a plausible
purpose), there should be factfinding at the trial court level on which the court of appeals
and the Supreme Court can rely. If not, there is some question about how the appellate
courts can find the purpose. Bedi does not seem to contemplate this problem. Instead, he
appears to argue that the motives supporting a statute enacted due to hostility or a particular
conception of the good life will be obvious to the Court. 158 While it seems obvious to the
modern mind that Jim Crow laws are based in hostility, there may remain a question about
other laws the Court would confront.159 As will be discussed later, Bedi seems to conclude
that if there is no reasonable purpose, the motive is hostile and the defense of the law
occurs in bad faith.160
In Part II, Bedi argues that strict scrutiny is not necessary to strike down racist classifications, and the standard “even perversely affirms the very racist beliefs [the Court]
seeks to counter.”161 Bedi believes that because the Court strictly scrutinizes a racial classification, it implies that racial classifications have justifications at least in some instances.162 This dangerous assumption underlies the strict scrutiny test—that racism or
racist beliefs may be rational. Bedi defines racism not as an unconscious or implicit bias
but as a dislike or hostility toward a racial group. 163 For example, he states that the belief
that one race is superior to another is a racist belief. 164 However, he notes that when the
Court scrutinizes racist laws more carefully, “[i]t suggests that racist laws and policies are
based on something other than animus or mere prejudice.” 165 Moreover, he argues that
affirmative action advocates place themselves in an unnecessary bind. By agreeing to the
strict scrutiny test that is unnecessary for racist laws, they then have to deal with the use
of strict scrutiny to examine remedial affirmative action laws and policies.166
Bedi criticizes the Court’s current affirmative action doctrine, which treats affirmative action legislation and policies the same as laws with a racist intent. 167 Bedi criticizes
the Court’s formal equality approach to race-based laws and policies.168 He differs, however, from the anti-subordination scholars who believe that courts should grant more leeway to the use of race to accomplish affirmative action. 169 These scholars, Bedi argues,
make a dangerous concession by acknowledging the acceptability of the strict scrutiny test
for racist legislation that does not have an affirmative action purpose. 170 Bedi claims that
anti-subordination scholars make a mistake because under his theory of looking at motive
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of the law, it would not be difficult for the Court to distinguish racist laws from wellintentioned ones, and it would be unnecessary to become bogged down in a discussion of
race as a protected class.171
In Part III, Bedi argues that intermediate scrutiny that is applied to sex discrimination
cases is based on the belief that men and women are different.172 He refutes this notion and
adopts a post-modern perspective, which sees gender as socially constructed rather than a
result of biology. He argues that we should question the constitutionality of sex-segregation and male-only military conscription because such legislation is based on an “idea that
males must act or be a certain way (aggressive or warlike) and females must act or be
another way (passive or sheltered).”173
Part III is perhaps the most interesting section of the book in that Bedi confronts the
criticism that his argument would lead to court approval of polygamous and incestuous
marriages. Bedi concludes that once the courts approve of gay marriage, there is a slippery
slope.174 Here, he agrees with the harshest critics of same-sex marriage in that once samesex marriage is state-sanctioned, it will be unreasonable for the state to draw a line between
same-sex marriage and polygamous or incestuous marriages among adults. 175 He admits
that his argument should lead to the disestablishment of marriage as a state-sanctioned
relationship because marriage is based on the conception of what the good life is.176 To the
extent this is true, following his argument in previous chapters, Bedi opines that the state
should not be in the business of marriage at all.
Bedi’s analysis of “purpose” or “motive” behind the law becomes much clearer in
this section. He engages in a type of reasoning that appears to require 100 percent congruity between the law’s stated purpose and its effect. To the extent that there is not 100
percent congruity, he concludes that the law is based in animus and hostility and that the
state’s defense of the law is in bad faith.177 For example, when he discusses laws against
plural marriage, he says there are two primary justifications for such laws: to prevent harm
to women and children and to ensure that wealthy men do not monopolize women in the
community.178 Noting that these concerns do not apply to all plural marriages—e.g., plural
marriages of three gay men—a “powers review” would invalidate at least some of the
limitations on these types of marriages. He argues that, in fact, the justification for the law
against plural marriage is really an after-the-fact justification.179 The constitutional question should be the actual reason for the law. Because there is a categorical ban of all types
of plural marriage, he concludes that the actual reason for the ban is an illegitimate one—
it is not to protect women, children, or the community.180 Banning all plural marriages
does not accomplish these goals. Therefore, he concludes that the law is based on nothing

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 143.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 209-10.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 222.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014

19

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 50 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 27

360

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:341

other than moral considerations—a motive that is illegitimate.181 If the law values a certain
way of life over another, a state does not have the power to enact it.182 This type of reasoning seems to require all laws to be super-efficient or judged as unconstitutional. In other
words, if the justification for the law does not work in every possible application, the justification is inadequate. But, even if there is not a 100 percent correlation between the goal
and the effect of a law, does this mean that legislators are not honestly engaged in trying
to protect women and children when they vote against plural marriage? And, is a law necessarily illegitimate if it reaches situations that do not create the problems that may have
been contemplated by legislators?
Despite these open questions, Professor Bedi has written an impressive account of a
new theory for interpreting the equal protection clause. His is a clear proposal for a new
vision of how to interpret the law. His vision differs from that of Carbado and Gulati and
Skrentny because he eschews the use of race, sex, or sexual orientation to interpret the
law. (Of course, he is interpreting the Constitution, whereas they are interpreting Title VII,
which refers to race and sex explicitly). But he is not advocating a false colorblindness
that they criticize. They seek a dialogue about how to reform the law or to reinterpret it,
as he does, but their reforms would likely require more discussion of race and sex (and
sexual orientation), whereas Bedi seeks to avoid the problems that arise from a race- or
sex-based approach. His book is well-written and organized and a very interesting read,
and it may present a viable means of re-interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, SEXUALITY, AND
DEMOCRACY FROM OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES
Ruthann Robson, a professor at CUNY Law School, has authored a fascinating book
that demonstrates her breadth of knowledge when it comes to constitutional and Title VII
law, as well as the history of the law seen through the lens of dress and other apparel. This
book differs from the others reviewed here most starkly because its purpose is not to suggest law reform, although it certainly raises many areas in which the law should be reformed. Dressing Constitutionally is an intellectual feast supported by fastidious research
on a broad range of issues grouped together under the concept of dress. But this does not
mean there is no thesis. There is. Robson demonstrates how the laws regulating dress and
undress define and regulate hierarchy and class and reinforce society’s strict gender norms.
The author engages in substantial legal analysis concerning governmental and private dress and appearance regulation. Her analysis crosses many legal disciplines and
demonstrates that dress regulation often is used to create and maintain hierarchies, to establish conformity, to reduce friction, and to deny religious rights. For example, the book
demonstrates that when the regulation deals with employers and employees, the employer
usually wins, and despite the individual’s First Amendment right to freedom of expression,
public schools have fairly wide leeway to regulate how students and teachers appear.
The book’s scope is broad temporally and substantively. It ranges from a discussion
of appearance regulation in Tudor England, to dress regulation in the Colonial era, to contemporary dress and appearance regulation in U.S. workplaces and prisons. Among many

181. Id. at 224.
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other topics, Robson discusses First Amendment expressive speech, Equal Protection
Clause interests in classifications based on sex/gender and race, laws criminalizing indecent exposure, Eighth Amendment proscriptions relating to dress in criminal and prison
contexts, and how free trade agreements enable the rise of sweatshops overseas and undermine American workers in the U.S.
The book is divided into seven chapters: 1) Dressing Historically; 2) Dressing
Barely; 3) Dressing Sexily; 4) Dressing Professionally; 5) Dressing Disruptively; 6) Dressing Religiously; and 7) Dressing Economically. Each one of these chapters contains sufficient material for a lengthy discussion that would far exceed the word count of this review,
but Robson demonstrates throughout the book that whether we are dressing “barely,” “sexily,” “professionally,” “disruptively,” or “religiously,” the government and the Constitution have a good deal to say about our ability to dress (or undress) in ways we desire.
In “Dressing Historically,” Robson discusses the dress code laws in Tudor England
that were used to maintain hierarchy. At first, the purpose of these laws was to distinguish
the Irish and the Scots from the English. Later, the dress and appearance laws required the
Irish and the Scots to assimilate.183 Colonists in America regulated dress and appearance
in a way that emphasized their concerns about hierarchy, sexuality, and democracy. 184 Persons were marked as criminals or moral deviants by enforcement of dress requirements.
Moreover, the colonies rebelled against England in large part because of a dispute over
wool. As England suffered economically, the colonial towns dedicated their commons to
sheep grazing to produce wool to be shipped to England. In return, England would turn
the raw wool into woolen fabrics that the colonies imported from England. The British
imposed taxes on the imports through a number of acts that the colonists resented. 185
“Dressing Barely” discusses the law regarding dress and undress—constitutional
doctrine regarding strip searches—and laws that prohibit obscenity and public nudity. In
both cases, Robson demonstrates that the laws were written and enforced more harshly
against less powerful groups. Strip searches raise a number of constitutional questions.
Courts look to whether there is at least a reasonable suspicion that there might be evidence
of a crime hidden on the person’s body. 186 Courts will also look to whether the search is
done in an “abusive fashion.”187 Robson describes the physical violence involved in a
search. For example, in Evans v. Stephens, police forced plaintiffs to disrobe, inserted an
unsanitized baton into the plaintiffs’ anuses, and used the same club to lift the plaintiffs’
testicles.188 This behavior was punctuated with racial slurs and threats. The court found
that given the totality of circumstances—physical force, anal penetration, unsanitariness,
racist language, and lack of privacy—the plaintiffs established a constitutional violation,
especially given that there were no exigent circumstances. 189
On the other hand, in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, the Supreme Court
upheld the strip search of a man accused of a minor crime and placed into the general
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
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prison population because of the concern that even those accused of minor offenses may
smuggle contraband into the prison. 190 Albert Florence was a finance executive for a car
dealership who described his search in graphic terms. As he was naked in front of guards,
they told him to “spread your cheeks.” A big man, Florence found the experience humiliating. “It made me feel less than a man. It made me feel not better than an animal.” 191 The
strip searches of Florence and Evans are reminiscent of sexual harassment and assault of
men and boys in workplaces and schools performed by groups of their male cohorts. Masculinities research demonstrates that men prove their masculinity to other men at work and
school by participating in group harassment of less powerful men. 192 The purpose is to
reinforce the masculinity of the individual members and to preserve the masculinity of the
job or program, and of the group. The courts, however, often describe this behavior as
“roughhousing” or “hazing” without recognizing that it is gendered. 193 Florence and the
cases in workplaces and schools permit the use of strip searches and “roughhousing” to
reinforce the gendered expectations of men in society, at work, and at school. But courts
ignore that the male group members who engage in strip searches and sexual assaults engage in this behavior as a performance of their masculinity.
Robson points out that Florence may leave men in a more vulnerable position than
women when it comes to strip searches.194 In Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding,195 the Court invalidated the strip search of a young girl in school who authorities
believed had prescription painkillers in her underwear. The Court took into account the
sex and age of the victim in determining that the search was unlawful. 196
Robson notes that strip searches occur to look for weapons, but also for less justifiable reasons such as a desire to humiliate a prisoner, as an interrogation technique (combined with the imposition of pieces of clothing, such as women’s underwear on men), and
discipline.197
In an interesting switch, Robson also discusses the laws against public nudity and
how they attempt to regulate sexuality, particularly female sexuality and homosexuality.
She demonstrates that these laws have historically made pariahs of women who are considered to be homosexuals or excessively sexual.198 This chapter also discusses legal regulation of nudity, pornography, and obscenity, and demonstrates the doctrinal inconsistency in this area. For example, Robson argues that the “secondary effects” (such as
increased crime) justification for banning nude dancing is not clearly supported by empirical evidence showing a link between nudity and secondary effects. 199 She concludes that
the law on nude dancing is logically inconsistent and based on class hierarchy. Moreover,
she explains that there is no equality in the regulation of men and women, and that the
190. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
191. ROBSON, supra note 3, at 36.
192. See Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment “Because of Sex,” 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1192 (2008).
193. Id. at 1227-30.
194. ROBSON, supra note 3, at 36.
195. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2010).
196. ROBSON, supra note 3, at 38.
197. Id. at 41.
198. Id. at 45.
199. Id. at 52-53.
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failure to treat men and women equally tends to maintain sexual hierarchies. 200
“Dressing Sexily” analyzes government regulation of male and female dress as a
means of enforcing gender norms—that men and women are biologically different and
that these differences must be reinforced. Judges have upheld city ordinances that forbid
men or women from cross-dressing in public. Even recently, the courts have upheld the
criminalization of cross-dressing but have refused to apply these laws to persons who are
transgender or are in the process of transitioning to the opposite sex. As Robson points
out, the courts’ response to laws criminalizing cross-dressing differentiates between those
who “innocently” cross-dress (because of their “illness”) and those deviants who do not;
however, the latter group is deviant only because of society’s rigid enforcement of a gender
order.201
In “Dressing Professionally,” Robson attacks the world of private employment and
the courts’ willingness to interpret Title VII to permit different dress regulations for men
and women, so long as there is no undue burden on either group. This approach clearly
contradicts the language of Title VII, which prohibits discrimination because of sex, but
reinforces gender norms accepted in society. Unfortunately, however, people like Darlene
Jespersen,202 who, as mentioned earlier, lost her job after 20 years as a bartender because
of her failure to wear make-up, are punished for their inability to comply with gender
norms even though the law appears to protect discrimination based on sex.
“Dressing Disruptively” discusses the use of dress to express one’s protest or rebellion and the protection, or lack thereof, of the First Amendment to do so. Robson discusses
the early cases where students in schools wore armbands to protest the Vietnam War, 203
and moves to what is perhaps the most interesting part of the chapter—the discussion of
laws in municipalities banning “saggy pants.”204 These bans on saggy pants in both schools
and municipalities have led to challenges arguing that the wearing of sagging pants is protected by the First Amendment freedom of expression clause.205 But, the courts have concluded that in order to challenge the saggy pants bans, the plaintiffs must show a specific
expression that the wearer intended to convey. 206 The problem is that as saggy pants become more popular, the courts are less likely to recognize First Amendment protection
because the message becomes less apparent to those who view the pants as a fashion
trend.207 A problem, of course, is that saggy pants are associated with young black boys,
and even if they are not prohibited by school rules or municipal codes, police use saggy
pants as part of an articulable suspicion of criminal activity when stopping and frisking
black male teenagers. As Robson explains, “the constitutional concern is that saggy pants
can operate as a proxy for race, as well as youth, and allow for ‘racial profiling’ without

200. Id. at 59.
201. Id. at 60-63.
202. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that Harrah’s
did not violate Title VII when it fired Jespersen for failing to wear makeup even though men in her job were not
required to wear makeup).
203. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
204. ROBSON, supra note 3, at 103.
205. Id. at 121.
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the explicit use of race.”208 I would add that it is not only a proxy for race and youth, but
also is gendered because it is black boys who wear saggy pants and who the police stop,
not black girls.
In “Dressing Religiously,” the book examines religious garb and its relationship to
the Constitution. Robson explains that while restrictions on religious garb and grooming
most often raise questions about the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, issues
also arise concerning the Establishment Clause. She concludes that religion has favored
status in U.S. constitutional law, but argues that this conclusion is not supported by the
text of the Constitution.209 In essence, she agrees with Justice Stevens that government
preference for religion, as opposed to a lack of religion, is forbidden by the First Amendment.210
This chapter examines a variety of cases—from a serviceman seeking to wear a yarmulke with his military garb, to Muslim women who challenged driver’s license rules
requiring that a woman expose her face for the photograph, to employees who wish to
wear various types or relics of religious garb, to prisoner cases involving various clothing
and hair requirements.211 Robson concludes that generally religion trumps a lack of religion in constitutional law, but that Muslims fare worse in the prison system than members
of other religions and that employers tend to trump all religions when their regulation of
dress and appearance has an effect on religion.212 Clearly, this chapter demonstrates the
varying hierarchies present in constitutional law and how such law addresses issues concerning religious claims.
Finally, in “Dressing Economically,” Robson examines the production of clothing
and the constitutional issues surrounding the labor used to produce clothing. She discusses
the relationship between slavery and the production of cotton, the Lochner era struggles in
clothing manufacturers and textile mills, and the more recent movement of clothing production to sweatshops in third world countries. 213 She explains the influence of free trade
agreements in destroying clothing manufacturing in the U.S. and in permitting the rise of
sweatshops in third world countries. 214 Robson examines local and state laws that have
procurement rules concerning fair working conditions, but, using the example of New
York, she demonstrates that the courts have found that the most restrictive local laws are
preempted by state law. She argues that federal courts would likely find that the state law
is preempted by the federal law that is much less protective. 215
As is obvious from this short description, Robson’s book is a comprehensive examination of the various constitutional and legal issues surrounding the production of clothing
and the regulation of dress by public and private entities. Her book demonstrates that the
law surrounding the production of clothing and appearance regulation establishes hierarchies in gender, race, and class in the U.S. and abroad.
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Applying Bedi’s Approach
An interesting test of Bedi’s proposal may apply to Robson’s example of equal protection challenges to sex-based dress codes in public places, workplaces, and schools.
These codes distinguish between dress and appearances permitted for males and females;
some municipalities prohibit cross-dressing in public.216 As Robson notes, the courts tend
to ignore that these regulations are openly discriminatory based on sex. 217 Title VII jurisprudence has added a judicially-created exception to the law that permits differential dress
codes so long as they do not impose an unequal burden on one group or another. 218 But
even though there might not be an unequal burden on a particular group—men or
women—there may be a serious burden placed on the individual who does not conform to
the society’s binary view of gender and sex.219 Even the best of these regulations ordinarily
requires a transgender individual to dress according to the rules for the sex to which he or
she is transitioning, thereby assuming erroneously that all persons are either male or female or engaged in a transition to maleness or femaleness. 220 Under the Equal Protection
Clause, courts have upheld dress codes that distinguish between male and female dress. 221
Would Bedi’s approach remediate these problems in public institutions whose regulations are challenged under the Equal Protection Clause? Rather than arguing that men
or women are at a disadvantage, Bedi would claim that the government does not have the
power to enforce the regulation because it is motivated by improper considerations—animus and/or a certain conception of the good life.222 The government, he would argue, has
no power to regulate citizen behavior and dress based on these motivations. 223 This argument has some benefits over the typical equal protection argument that would need to
convince a judge that a particular “female” or “male” dress code creates unequal treatment.
Instead, it avoids the question of the comparison of the codes—the concept of unequal
burdens. It focuses instead on the reason for creating the differentiation. Based on Robson’s observation that courts are often blind to gender-based arguments in this area because their view of gender is so entrenched,224 Bedi’s argument could go either way.
Courts could quickly reject Bedi’s argument based on common sense notions that there
are biological differences between men and women that drive the differential dress codes.
But with proper expert testimony, and access to Robson’s and Bedi’s books, a court might
recognize that gender-based dress codes are as arbitrary as the Colorado constitutional
amendment struck down by the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans, which forbade localities
from passing legislation that made discrimination against homosexuals illegal.225 Robson’s
book demonstrates the importance of dress code regulation, which has often been underestimated by courts, while Bedi’s book provides a mode of analysis that should lead courts
to strike these regulations down as violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
216.
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V. CONCLUSION
All four of these books deal with the importance of legal regulation and interpretation in shaping and/or reinforcing society’s views concerning hierarchy, especially with
reference to race, gender, class, and sexuality. Acting White demonstrates that despite Title
VII law, individuals of color must engage in identity performances that are palatable to
whites to compete in workplaces and other arenas. After Civil Rights describes a new legal
realism that demonstrates that law and legal interpretation may have little effect on the
actual behavior of employers’ hiring and promotion practices. Beyond Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation argues that we should avoid class based analysis by making equal protection claims that challenge the motivations behind the regulation in question and arguing
that the government has no power to enact the regulation. Dressing Constitutionally
demonstrates that legal interpretation and enforcement of dress codes is very much intertwined with concepts of hierarchy, class, and gender. Each of these books articulates an
important theory of race, gender, and/or sexuality and law while suggesting reform. As a
group, these books contribute to the literature in important ways. They provide new theory
about how the law should treat race, class, gender, and sexuality, and an abundance of
empirical data and doctrinal analysis that should assist practicing lawyers, policy experts,
judges, and academics to further understand how law has the capacity to either protect
Outsiders or to impose significant burdens on them.
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